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Concealing screens: Consent, control and
the desiring user  / Kirsty Best
Abstract: This article traces the contemporary cultural
history of consent to information control. It argues that in
order to begin to understand why people consent to the loss
of control over their digital devices we need to see users as
desiring subjects positioned at a cultural moment where the
digital information screen has been enlisted as a central
driver of both utility and pleasure, but where its
architectural ability for additional functional control
remains obscured.
Digital devices and concealing screens
<1> In the post-9/11 world, we are regularly called upon to
provide personal information in order to complete even the
simplest of activities, our identity a pass-card in
contemporary society. Most of us will already be aware of the
extent to which digitization aids in recording, organizing,
storing, retrieving, collating and merging information about
individuals, social groups and populations. This information
is often matched and patterned in ways to materialize
evanescent and invisible correlations between either of the
two constant topics of interest -- spending rituals or
suspicious activity -- and anything else, including not only
the good old stand-bys of race, gender, zip code and age, but
also much more idiosyncratic information, such as car colour
preference, baby name selection or length of time between
moves. Many commentators have noted the problems this
facility raises as surveillance capacities balloon and social
groups are summoned, Hoodini-style, out of patterns of 0s and
1s and marginalized in one, digital swoop.
<2> Less well known is the way in which digital technologies
are also often inscribed with layers of code which constrain
use, but which are unreadable to the average user. For
example, so-called spyware, surreptitiously downloaded to a
user's computer during a visit to a website, modifies
functionality of that user's computer environment while also
enabling devices which tabulate information about his or her
computer use. More broad-sweeping programs have been dubbed
Digital Rights Management: systems which intend to tackle
cultural trends of file swapping, sharing and copying head-on
by coding fences, cages and barriers of prevention into the
code. These strategies are attempting to bypass ongoing
cultural struggles to define the public use of information --
or e-commons -- mounted by political groups and online
subcultures concerned about digital use, including the open
software movement, political hacking groups like the Cult of
the Dead Cow, and civil liberties groups like the ElectronicReconstruction 10.2 (2010)
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Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and the Global Internet
Liberty Campaign (GILC), to name just a few. Coding shuts
down dialogue and bypasses democratic consent.
<3> At the same time, people appear to be consenting, if not
in the public sphere, then in their everyday practices as
they develop more familiar relationships with digital
technologies. This has occurred as technologies have adopted
more accessible forms of interface design. In particular, the
screen has become a technology which has facilitated
widespread integration of digital information technologies
into cultural routines. For instance, as computers developed
graphical user interfaces and the World Wide Web became
visual, familiarity with this technology grew exponentially.
Now computers and the Internet are firmly positioned as
domestic, useful and friendly technologies in advertising and
media discourses.
<4> But we're not just talking about desktop computers here.
Screens are omnipresent elsewhere in everyday life. Personal
digital assistants, laptops, and cell phones are becoming
regular components of our body armor, while encounters with
ATMs, automatic grocers and digital signatures are part of
our daily wanderings through urban space. It is the smooth,
lit surface of the screen which allows for a comfortable fit
between users and their technological counterparts, and
screens which play a part in wallpapering urban culture and
bodily fashion with computer components.
<5> The comfortable and user-friendly interface offered by
the screen makes the world of digital operations accessible
and visible to users, allowing far greater interaction than
was every possible with cursor-based systems like DOS. But
paradoxically, users are increasingly less aware of how these
digital systems operate, and particularly, how digital code
works to constrain, shape and tabulate their interactions.
The screen contributes both to the visible tactility of
computers, but also to their obscurity. As screen-interfaced
digital technologies become embedded in everyday life, their
capacity for information control is likewise embedded.
Greater usability appears to come at the expense of control
over technology: control over understanding and manipulating
technology and control over one's own information. Although
some voices are rising in opposition to this loss of
individual control, many technology users appear to accept
greater usability as a trade-off for decreased control.
<6> This paper will not present empirical evidence, but will
instead develop a theoretical framework which I will use to
analyze an ongoing empirical study involving a program of in-
depth interviews and policy analysis. I argue here that in
order to begin to understand why people consent to the loss
of control over their digital devices we need to see users as
desiring subjects positioned at a cultural moment where the
digital information screen has been enlisted as a central
driver of both utility and pleasure, but where its
architectural ability for additional functional control
remains obscured.
From disciplinary to architectural control
<7> There is a growing body of work responding to issues
around surveillance and privacy in relation to information
technologies. Earlier work includes the comprehensive
overviews of those such as Lyon (1994), Rochlin (1997) and
Garfinkel (2000); more recent studies address the pressing
nature of these issues since 9/11 (e.g., Staples 2002, Lyon
2003a, Parenti 2003). Although all aspects of this work are
significant in addressing democratic questions, Lyon'sReconstruction 10.2 (2010)
http://reconstruction.eserver.org/102/recon_102_best01.shtml[2/07/2012 11:24:35 AM]
(2003b) recently edited book is particularly important in
this regard, exploring how surveillance is geared toward
social sorting and hence more than merely an issue for
individual privacy. There is also a well-established
literature in sociology and philosophy which addresses
general social conditions of information control in relation
to modernity. Work which considers the history and
development of information control technologies includes that
of Weber (1947), Beniger (1986), Giddens (1990), Webster and
Robins (1989), Miller and Rose (1990), and Foucault (1979,
1981). Deleuze (1990) has pushed Foucault's theory of a
disciplinary society to the next level with his ideas about a
society of control, which have been taken up by others (e.g.,
Galloway 2004, Hardt and Negri 2000, Lyon 2001, Urry 2002).
<8> Although theoretical and empirical work has well
addressed the possibilities for surveillance afforded by
digital technologies, information control issues are much
broader than those of surveillance. Information control takes
several forms. It implies not only information tabulation but
also the constriction of possible uses of a technology, or
the shaping of use within particular parameters.
<9> Digital devices are increasingly coated in technological
coding which shapes, constrains and otherwise controls
possible use of technologies. Crippleware is one example:
digital hardware sold with reduced functionality in order to
short-circuit attempts at piracy. Other less well-known cases
include the infiltration and modification of settings on
American Online users' private computers, new forms of spam
which display ads with a graphic file in order to circumvent
verbal filtering systems, and internal coding of Adobe's
Photoshop which prevents users from copying banknotes. All of
these forms of information control operate through visually
interfaced technologies, but obscure their own traces at the
level of code. Research on information control has tended to
overlook the broader context of these tactics, although two
notable exceptions are Lawrence Lessig (1999) and Alexander
Galloway (2004), whom I will discuss below.
Information control at our fingertips
<10> At the core of the interface between a culture of user-
friendliness and a culture of consent to digital information
manipulation is the issue of control. Greater control is the
goal of strategies to make digital code more compliant to
surveillance and to impose restrictions on use. We need to
describe the cultural and material environment of
communication technologies in order to understand the ways in
which these technologies implicate control, but also how and
why information control has become such a subject of concern.
Control is also at issue for user consent, and in more ways
than one. We need to understand not only if and how users
experience any loss of control in terms of limited
functionality, but also if and how users experience greater
control over digital technologies as they interface with
increasingly user-friendly systems.
<11> That control is key to this puzzle is unsurprising,
given that control appears to be central to technology
itself, and is a long-standing concern in the philosophy of
technology. J. McGregor Wise (1997) makes the compelling case
that many theories of technology fall into one of two camps.
Those which stress the power of technology to control us,
characteristic of Jacques Ellul and Marshall McLuhan and
others, emphasize if not technological determinism, then
technological constructivism. Those which stress our power to
control technology, characteristic of Donald MacKenzie and
Wiebe Bijker emphasize if not social determinism then socialReconstruction 10.2 (2010)
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constructivism, or the social construction of technology. The
battle rages on, apparently indefinitely, but Wise points to
a third approach which skirts the issue altogether by
reframing the question of control. This is the approach
characteristic of Bruno Latour (1988, 1990), Michel Callon
(1986), John Law (1992) and many others associated with the
once-named actor-network theory (I will use the acronym ANT
here to cover work related to these theorists, both during
and after the heyday of so-called actor-network theory). ANT
complicates control by suggesting that the real issue is not
control over (i.e. human control over technology or
technological control over humanity) but control and. The
actors which play a part in control are many, varied and
dispersed; include both human and technological actors; and
need to be marshaled, channeled, and otherwise organized into
vectors of control. As actors are mobilized in different
ways, control is translated from one form to another -- say
from a human police officer to a robot police officer to a
sign to a speed bump (Latour 1988).
<12> This vision of control bears a number of similarities to
that offered by Lawrence Lessig (1999) in his well-quoted
work Code and other laws of cyberspace, in which he asks the
question "what things regulate?" He comes up with four such
things: law, norms, the market and architecture. The
simplicity of Lessig's schemata is powerful, although
somewhat limited. But the real impact of his theory comes
from two elements, which in their own way reproduce many of
the insights of ANT. First of all, when Lessig speaks of
architecture, he refers to anything which tends to use
material structure to regulate: walls, speed bumps, and
importantly for our contemporary world, digital code.
Secondly, Lessig's contention is that each kind of regulator
can be translated into another kind -- and a strong trend he
identifies is that control is increasingly being exercised
through programming software rather than in the courts.
<13> Thus both ANT and Lessig suggest a way for us to
consider control as a series of translations between
different modes of regulating. Here I would point out that
although Lessig's "architecture" regulator would seem to be
another word for technology or technological actor, and
indeed this may be what he intends, this reading has the
problem of reproducing the dichotomy between human and
technology that ANT has been so good at overcoming. Instead,
it is important to consider each regulator as a combination
of technological, semiotic and human elements. For instance,
laws, which can broadly be interpreted to mean the type of
discursive production of rules, practices and institutional
structures associated with government, courts, police and
even bureaucracies, rely not merely on systematically agreed-
on protocol. As Foucault has been so good at showing us,
these forms of discipline also rely on material technologies
to reproduce themselves, organize, and be effective.
Similarly, any form of architecture, be it a speed bump,
prison or computer program, integrates semiotic vocabularies
as well as material parts. Obviously I am extending Lessig
substantially here, for there are limitations in the
simplicity of his schema; however, his perspective is
important for highlighting changes to democratic policy, as
regulation migrates to digital code. Lessig's four regulators
can be taken to be particularly successful modes of
organizing, accumulated over long periods of time -- the
institutionalization of rules that we call law, the cultural
patterns that get sedimented into norms, the transactions of
value and economic resources known as the market, the
capacity to shape and mould material substance we call
architecture -- that is, into long-standing machines of
control.Reconstruction 10.2 (2010)
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<14> The "machine" is Deleuze and Guattari's (e.g., 1987)
method of understanding these patterns of control. Their
contribution is important not only for supplying a
complementary language to much of ANT and an alternative form
of post-structural analysis of organizing, but also for
theorizing two crucial missing elements in the actor-network
approach. The first is the issue of affect: the desiring,
emotional, cultural, meaningful components to the emergence
of patterns of control. These are framed by Deleuze and
Guattari's conception of the territorializing machine. The
second is the question of how the resources which fuel these
vectors of control -- material, symbolic and affective -- are
distributed, which they describe as the distributing machine.
<15> These theoretical contributions to technology and
control allow us to move beyond the question of whether
society or technology takes precedence, and concentrate
instead on the way in which control is managed, organized,
and brought into being, as well as the types of power these
patterns both imply and evoke. Further, they suggest that
control does not exist pre-discursively. There is no set of
issues and things we need to be concerned about controlling
which we progressively tend to. Nor is there a series of
resources that will allow us to control these things, waiting
to be taken up and used. The desire to control has to be
created, and the resources made meaningful and convincing.
<16> Digital screen technologies, those PDAs, laptops, cell
phones and ATMs that we encounter daily in our cultural
environs, had to be made meaningful as potential objects of
control -- before they could be used as corporate and state
forms of information control, as well as user-friendly means
to empowerment. Callon and Latour have described a similar
process when it comes to the formation of scientific
knowledge. There needs to be a problematization, as the
object of concern is made meaningful, interessement where
people are made to be concerned, and enrolment and
mobilization of various human and technological actors,
particularly through the formation and distribution of
inscriptions, linguistic and visual displays of codified
information. Other theoretical approaches have suggested
similar insights, but emphasize the cultural aspects of the
struggle, where discourse and practice intertwine at various
levels, rather than the intentional approach suggested by
ANT. The most influential of these has been Michel Foucault's
(1979, 1981a, 1981b) discussion of the formation of
discourse, where language, practices and material resources
combine to define subjects (e.g., the insane, prisoners), and
human relations (e.g., sexuality). Cultural theorists have
developed similar insights, arguing that ongoing struggles to
signify (Stuart Hall, e.g., 1981) and language wars (Jeff
Lewis, e.g., 2000) mark the terrain of contemporary culture,
as cultural competition takes place to define reality.
Enlisting information
<17> The cultural trend for digitally-aided information
control from technologies sporting user-friendly screens
which are imagined to satisfy the needs of corporations,
state actors and consumers alike, is the result of one such
ongoing struggle. It is brought about through the
construction of desire and lack, and the definition of
technological and human identities. Perhaps the most obvious
identity which is constructed and enlisted in this language
war is information itself, defined as an object for control,
and one which can be controlled. It may appear to us, so
firmly ensconced in our (post)modern world that more
information quite obviously leads to control. (Although asReconstruction 10.2 (2010)
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academics perhaps we are loath to admit that anything is
obvious). Information manipulation is what makes modern
discipline modern. It is also what makes it postmodern. But
information first needs to be constructed as a good, and
hence become an object of desire. Lack of information is then
cause for concern, breeding the need for control. As Chris
Hables Gray (2000) argues, even though contemporary forms of
control such as warfare rely ever more on information, we are
beset by "an astounding ignorance about information's basic
structure and functions." If we weren't, we would see that
"we don't really know what information is." Simon Cooper
agrees, and argues that "the analogy between control and
ownership of information is a false one" and "the sheer
proliferation of information threatens to undermine any claim
to security or even truth" (2003: 107).
<18> This does not mean that does information does not have
real effects. The piles and piles of data archives and traces
we are assembling continue to effectuate new relationships of
power. But power is not the same as control. Power is the
distribution of resources and meanings. Control is the
perception of vectors of influence. Others have traced out
moments in the construction of a desire for information
control. Ian Hacking (1986) has analyzed the contemporary
number fetish, which he traces to the 19th century. Latour
(1988, 1990) has theorized the influence accorded to
inscriptions in contemporary culture. In a recent empirical
study, Brian Bloomfield (1991) has examined the persuasive
tactics used to introduce computer information systems in
Britain to convince doctors to manage expenses better.
Bloomfield's research demonstrates the cyclical and
reinforcing nature of this cultural construction. Here, an
existing desire for information control already underpinned
the rationale for the system's introduction, but it was also
a desire which was fanned into ever larger flames as doctors
and staff came on board to adopt the system. And finally, it
was used as a means, through inscriptions provided by the
system itself and displayed gloriously on computer screens,
to validate and justify the original desire.
Enter the screen
<19> Alongside the enlistment of information, there need to
be ideas about a correct and effective means of achieving
this object of desire and concern. Here is where digital
screen technologies come in more directly. That is, if
digital screen technologies are going to be mobilized for
this task, what is the rationale? It is not immediately
intuitive that control is possible either through computer
code, or through a screenic interface with that code. As
Ellen Rose (2003) argues, computer programs are notoriously
buggy, incomplete and frustrating, and screen-centric graphic
interfaces do little to live up to the constructed promise of
user-friendliness. More generally, how did computer screens
proliferate in our lives, and how did we come to believe we
are more in charge of our information than we were with our
address books, telephone numbers and appointments chiseled
onto paper?
<20> The user-friendly screen as we know it is in no way
intuitively user-friendly. As Rose describes it, the
nomenclature "user-friendly" itself, as it refers more
broadly to computer programs, was originally intended as a
slur against the much maligned computer user by more expert
programmers. But what is interesting is how this concept has
not only been taken up by corporations to market their goods,
but seems to have been particularly successful at attaching
itself specifically to the graphic user interface (GUI) we
have come to know. We have absorbed the idea that the visualReconstruction 10.2 (2010)
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screen display is indeed friendly and imparts greater control
to the user. Much of our world, now surrounded by such
screens, has become immersed in a culture of user-
friendliness.
<21> If we trace the history of the computer screen display,
this trajectory is not obvious. Indeed, it has relied on the
unlinking of particular associations between computers and
information control, and the forging of others. Associations
of control, which in the 1980s were firmly attached to the
command line (the very language is suggestive), the no-
nonsense interface, and the manipulation and calculation of
data, have been weakened. As Steven Johnson explains,
business magazines mocked the Macintosh interface initially,
and for reasons specifically associated with control. A
graphic user interface was considered to be good for the
artistic world of design, but far too frivolous for "the
average middle manager" who "has little need for the graphics
capability of MacPaint. Most managers have a hard enough time
writing reports, without having to worry about designing them
as well." (Forbes, Feb 13 1984, quoted Johnson 1997: 55).
This editorial in Forbes was typical of the time, but a far
cry from the current craze for PowerPoint everything, and the
mandated crash course in the Microsoft Office suite needed
for these very same business managers. Visual displays are no
longer associated with graphic design of reports, but simply,
obviously, with the writing of these reports, the finding of
information to fill them with, and the sending of them in a
speedy and urgent manner via the networks at our fingertips:
all functions afforded to us by our screens. New
associations, or articulations (Hall), have been created
between visual display and control.
<22> These re-articulations were the result of a broad
cultural shift which cannot be explained by the minimal
threat Macintosh and its small but loyal user base posed to
IBM or Microsoft. Instead, they need to be seen as a long
sweep toward a visually delivered, information-rich,
networked and consumer-driven landscape. It is a long trend
which has attempted to affix itself to a variety of cultural
objects, with different degrees of success. What the computer
has morphed into, in conjunction with the Internet, is not
the apogee of a move toward user-friendliness, but the most
recent rendition of a technological narrative that has become
increasingly dominant, a narrative that enlists visual
display, computer memory and networking to the task of the
greater provision of information control. This mobilization
seems to have worked, even caught on like wildfire, but to
look back even a couple of decades ago when another
technology was enrolled unsuccessfully makes us realize the
constructed nature of the enterprise.
<23> In the sixties, as Kenneth Lipartito relates, the
Picturephone had similar intentions, but as we know, never
caught on. Rather than tell the tale as one of failure,
Lipartito urges us to consider the way the Picturephone was a
moment in a cultural framework which has only strengthened,
told in new ways and with new technological and human actors.
Not simply a phone with an image, the Picturephone was
conceived as "the user interface to a vast new architecture
of information conveyance":
Data communications and other informational uses,
as much or more than video telephony, were part of
Picturephone's justification from the start. Bell
engineers saw themselves at work on a
"technological marriage between the computer and
the Picturephone" that would permit households to
receive local weather reports, watch the stockReconstruction 10.2 (2010)
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market, and make airline reservations [ . .] Video
capacity would provide a way of displaying data,
sending text and graphical images, selling products,
and conducting classes.
Sound familiar? Lipartito's point is that so-called
technological failures have strong cultural impacts: they are
both the product of social interactions and imagination, and
the source of future modes of imagining. My point is that
this mode of imagining was, at its core, a belief that a
visual display of information could and would lead to more
effective information control. Visual displays were enrolled
as actors in this imagining, associated to communication
networks by being affixed to telephones. This association was
unreliable, and visual displays de-inscribed themselves from
their telephonic counterparts. By the early eighties, new
delegates had already been enlisted. Digital watches were
taking up the same banner, integrating thermometers,
translation equipment and TV screens as early as 1982. Since
then, mobile phones, Palm Pilots and now cameras have each
proceeded in the same manner. Each of these new delegates
reinforces the articulation between information, digital
screens and user control in its own way, another step in a
broader cultural narrative.
The pleasure and ease of consent
Communicating screenic relationships
<24> Somewhere along the way, then, graphical screens came to
be experienced by users as user-friendly. And they continue
to be experienced that way on a daily basis. The cultural
narrative has been taken up and reproduced; we have enlisted
ourselves alongside our technological delegates. How has this
taken place? How have do we experience a culture of mobile,
user-friendly visual technology, and how does our experience
translate into forms of consent to information control
inscribed within these very systems?
<25> Researchers interested in human-technological
interaction stress the importance of interface design in
enabling users to understand and master their digital
devices. Donald Norman's notion of affordance has been
particularly useful. An affordance is a technological
capacity which allows a user to accomplish something. Rex
Hartson usefully extends Norman's analysis by suggesting a
convenient taxonomy of different types of affordance.
Functional affordances are the ways in which the technology
allows us to manipulate the world. Physical affordances
enable that manipulation by providing things like levers,
dials, gears, or buttons. Cognitive affordances allow us to
understand how the levers and buttons operate, and how we
should use them. Sensory affordances affect both physical and
cognitive affordances by appealing directly to our senses and
allowing us to see the dial, or perceive the inscription that
indicates which way to turn it. Much current writing in
human-interface design concentrates on how programmers and
designers should design technology in such a way as to
optimize all these types of affordance: to maximize ease of
use. A visual display is already well ahead of the game, by
this logic, because it makes good use of the sensory
affordance of sight, thereby easing our understanding
(cognitive affordance) and ability to manipulate (physical
affordance) the computer.
<26> But affordances do not merely inhere in the technology:
they are relational. Practices -- looking at a screen, moving
a mouse, pressing a key -- are materially structured in terms
of what can and cannot be done, and with how much stickinessReconstruction 10.2 (2010)
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or ease, but they are also habits that we incorporate into
our being. As habits, practices are "contractions of thought
and movement" (Wise, 1997). They are not only incorporated
into and breed new routines, but are incorporated into and
breed new discourses. With digital screen technologies, even
those whose affordances seem to be approaching greater ease
of use, the experience of user-friendliness is mutable. What
is interesting is not so much that people resist the idea of
user-friendliness, but that they don't. For all the talk of
user-friendliness, computer interfaces tend much more toward
stickiness than ease of use. And yet, to look around, we do
appear to be in a culture that is convinced it relies on
user-friendly digital technologies for daily tasks. Now that
digital devices are everywhere, and the cultural norm appears
to be that electronic records available for visual call-up
are necessary forms of personal information management, to
experience the technology in a different way marks you as the
sticking point, not the technology. As Ellen Rose (2003)
argues, people tend to blame themselves for their frustration
with user-friendly interfaces.
<27> Belief in greater information control does not only
guide our direct interaction with the interface (which helps
us to overlook frustrations over cognitive and physical
affordances), but also our experiences of digital screen
technologies as empowering elements in our personal
information management. The screen has been delegated in
contemporary culture as a communication tool adapted to our
continual need to monitor our technologically mediated
worlds. As a communication device, it is the screen which
allows continual feedback on the results of manipulations
provided by keyboards and other input devices which are
intended to bring about appropriate functions from the
attached microprocessing device. And today's digital devices
are dedicated to functions which are highly suited to the
screen as an output mechanism. Indeed, much of what we do
with our digital screen devices is monitor various worlds.
For instance, the screen on my stove allows for monitoring of
the technological world constructed within the appliance
itself. The screen I use to measure indoor and outdoor
temperature monitors a technologically mediated external
world. The screen I use to write this paper monitors a
technologically constructed communication world. We
experience information control when we interface with our
digital screen technologies, then, not only because we read
them through our cultural filters as user-friendly, but
because we read them also as functional, useful and
necessary. Incorporation into the practice and idea of
information empowerment -- control over our technologically
mediated worlds -- is enacted at this level as well.
<28> This incorporation includes what has been described as
participatory surveillance by Poster (1991), and correlates
with Foucault's idea of governmentality, or the conduct of
conduct, where we are interpellated into our own discipline.
It could be understood in ANT's language as subscription or
enrolment, as we take up the part offered to us by the
technology—but not only the technology itself. We see
ourselves as participant -- users in the broader culture of
user-friendly digital devices. This is Gramsci's (1971)
operation of hegemony, fueled by the kind of persuasive
consent that allows us to see ourselves benefiting from the
control scenario. For instance, the doctors using the
resource management computer systems in Bloomfield's study
saw benefits for their own idea of personal information
management, even as it allowed for greater regulation and
monitoring of their previously more fluid workday.
<29> These theories all touch on the idea of the pleasure ofReconstruction 10.2 (2010)
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consent that we garner through our self-involvement in
technological culture. The systems of digital screens become
something we value. But we need to probe this idea further.
How does this value develop? How is it distributed? What are
the territorializing and distributing machines at work here?
Cultivating and distributing electronic pleasures
<30> Pleasurable and consensual interactions with
communication technology happen because of affective
resources at our disposal. As Bourdieu (1984) has shown,
taste is a matter of having access to various kind of
knowledge, dispositions, practices and beliefs. These forms
of capital allow us to interact with screens and digital
technologies more broadly. As we interact with our digital
screen technologies, we develop abilities, vocabularies,
rituals and relationships with the technology, like familiar
ways of organizing icons on our screens, or displaying
multiple windows. We also have access to an accumulating
discourse about information management and computer
effectiveness, as we watch a growing torrent of ads for
digital technologies, like the ubiquitous AOL ads that
illustrate the shield of protection around the user's home,
bouncing off nasty hackers, viruses and spyware, or the
Expedia.com ads which show a busy mother managing her trip in
a flash online. These ads are compounded in our social
interactions at work or with friends, who might even act as
"warm experts" for us (Bakardjieva), sharing insights into
their technological experiences.
<31> Not only do our present abilities create value for us,
then, but also our ties with others: our ability to
communicate and reinforce those values. Our social
networking, both real and virtual, intensifies our
experiences. Our communication with technologically mediated
worlds -- the mediaworld -- does likewise. And finally, our
communication with technology draws us in as well, seducing
us with the familiarity of its rhythms.
<32> Territorializing machines work to create patterns of
intensity and affect. Distributing machines distribute access
to technology, skills, and exposure to discourse unevenly
across culture. Those who receive education and hands-on
practice, or are part of technologically motivated
subcultures, develop strong bonds with the technology which
reinforce their experiences of control. Those who don't have
access to these things are still enveloped in a media
discourse which validates these experiences of control as the
norm. In many ways, then, we are drawn into consent, but
unevenly, and with different effects.
Toward ever-expanding embedded functionality?
<33> Consenting to the experience of information control is,
at the same time, not merely an intensification and
validation of a functional relationship with technology. We
also open ourselves up to a variety of other modes of
potential information control enabled by digital delegation
caught up in corporate and state vectors of control. The
technological specificity of a computer means that it can
replicate the functions of most other machines. Its ability
for functional affordance, in other words, is unmatched.
There is no one specific task designed for a computer: it can
take on anything that can be programmed. As microprocessing
capacity increases, digital devices not only multiply their
"applications" -- or modes of functional affordance -- but
they also have greater and greater capacity to include
additional functions not limited to these applications.Reconstruction 10.2 (2010)
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<34> Code is already a complex architectural structure that
works by shaping user interaction with the computer as much
as computer manipulation of the world. Think of a child-proof
lighter: the only way to light the lighter is to activate the
extra part (useless to the lighting itself) by pressing down
on it. This is an architectural solution to control. Now
think of how code has the intrinsic ability to layer in
multiple child-proofing devices -- or, more likely, copyright
protections, disabling mechanisms, tallying devices. Then you
can see how the possibilities for architectural control in
our contemporary world are expanding exponentially, given the
pervasiveness of microprocessors.
<35> Of course we can tear off that little black strip on the
lighter, if we know how, have the ability, and care enough to
do it. The same is true of consent to information control.
Let's talk just briefly about some of the ways in which
resistance to control can be manifest. Affect and
incorporation, so important to our continual valuing of
information control, are themselves unstable materials. The
desire for information control can become a force which is
not contained by the software and hardware delegates intended
to marshal it. As users are more and more engaged by the
relations they experience with worlds to which digital screen
technologies construct, particularly media worlds, we can see
people's affective attachments increase. The proliferating
practices of downloading music, games, and movies, validated
within a wide variety of youth subcultures indicates this
spread and growth of attachment to the control we have been
accustomed to receiving from our digital technologies. Other
counter-trends include hacking subcultures which have the
skill and desire to counter unobtrusive coding, draw on
counter-discourses and a strong sense of historical
attachment to digital technology, and feed these downloading
practices. In the first case, the desire to download feeds
directly off the desire for information control, showing that
the technological narrative does not stop with the creation
of a popular and effective system like the combination of
computer-Internet, but continues to mutate, stretch and be
struggled over by changing rhythms of desire. The second case
illustrates that the struggle continues to define and shape
these narratives, and that language wars battle over the
meaning and material practice of technology.
<36> These trends are not to be taken lightly, but I suggest
that a more substantial and widespread engagement with change
needs to occur for real cultural struggle against the
elephant of information control. Various interventions have
been suggested by critics of technology. Feenberg (1991.
1995, 1999) argues that critical discourses about technology
and technological policy need to become a priority. Barnes
points out that alternative interfaces which afford the user
more direct control over the functional affordances (better
levers if you will) were part of the original vision of the
initiators of the GUI like Alan Kay-- perhaps these designs
could be revisited. Rose suggests that the user could take
more responsibility for choice about when and how to succumb
to the tempting discourse of total empowerment by making
small, daily choices.
<37> For any of these to happen, we need a better
understanding of two things. First we need to look at the
technology and the policy. We need to understand what is
happening, how these technologies are being coded, what they
have in common with each other. And we need to look at the
users. We need a better understanding of why we consent, why
we don't. Are Rose's piecemeal forms of user responsibility
feasible? How can they become a powerful cultural
countertrend? In these two areas, empirical work needs to beReconstruction 10.2 (2010)
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done.
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